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TOWARD A TORT-BASED THEORY OF
CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES,
AND RACIAL JUSTICE
Jody D. Armour*
Civil rights and civil justice (especially that aspect of the civil
justice system that centers on personal injury law) are wedded in
many ways. This essay focuses on a critical conceptual connection
between the two-namely, the way in which the general analytical
framework of tort law debunks the mistaken assumptions underlying
the practice of racial profiling, one of the most pressing civil rights
and racial justice concerns of our day. Because the same mistaken
assumptions that buttress racial profiling also undergird increasingly
popular cutbacks in civil liberties in the name of greater homeland
safety, tort jurisprudence also provides crucial theoretical and
normative leverage for understanding and ultimately combating such
retrenchment.
It comes as no surprise that principles and perspectives drawn
from tort law provide the ideal touchstones for evaluating the stated
justifications for racial profiling (and other curtailments of civil
liberties). For, at bottom, these justifications center on the increased
safety provided by profiling and reducing civil liberties. And, of
course, the most basic concern of accident law (the main though not
only subject of the torts) is how we think about and strike the balance
between safety and other competing but important social interests.
The formula most frequently invoked to express this balancing
process is "B<PL." The "B" represents the burden of precautions
while the "PL" represents the gravity of injury multiplied (i.e.,
discounted) by the probability of its occurrence. According to this
formula, when the burden ("B") or expected cost of accident
* Jody D. Armour is the Roy P. Crocker Professor of Law at University
of Southern California Law School.
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prevention is less than the expected cost of the accidents that a given
precaution can prevent ("PL"), then the actor is at fault for failing to
take that precaution. Put differently, the world is full of risks ("PL"s
abound) but safety costs (reducing those risks) requires an
adjustment of competing interests. The B<PL formula provides a
way of thinking about how much invasion of health and safety
interests we are willing to socially accept in return for competing
social interests and values.
I will deploy both this distinctly tort test of reasonableness and
other tort perspectives in analyzing the practice of racial profiling.
Defenders of racial profiling (e.g., economist Walter Williams,
columnist Richard Cohen, pundit Dinesh D'Souza) l contend that,
given statistics demonstrating Blacks' disproportionate engagement
in street crime, it is reasonable to perceive a greater threat
from someone Black than someone White. Walter Williams, a
conservative Black economist, refers to someone who does so as an
"Intelligent Bayesian," named for Sir Thomas Bayes, the father
of statistics.2  For Williams, stereotypes are merely statistical
generalizations, probabilistic rules of thumb that, when accurate,
help people make speedy and often difficult decisions in a world of
imperfect information. The "Bayesian's" argument is simple: "As
much as I regret it, I must act differently toward Blacks because it is
logical to do so." According to the Bayesian, because race is
statistically related to the risk of crime a person poses, it is rational to
discriminate on the basis of race when making such assessments.
"Rational discrimination" is his watchword. And he admonishes us
not to equate rational discrimination with racism, which is commonly
understood as irrational animus toward another group.
Although some might take issue with the claim that there are
differences in rates of street crime by race, I will assume for the sake
of further analysis that, tragically, such differences exist. Given that
the blight of institutional racism continues to disproportionately limit
the life chances of African Americans, and that desperate
1. See, e.g., Walter E. Williams, The Intelligent Bayesian, in The
Jeweler's Dilemma, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 10, 1986, at 18; Richard
Cohen, A Study in Differences, WASH. POST, May 28, 2002, at A17, 2002 WL
21747539; DINESH D'SOUZA, THE END OF RACISM 245-87 (1995).
2. Williams, supra note 1, at 18.
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circumstances increase the likelihood that individuals caught in this
web may turn to desperate undertakings, such a disparity, if it exists,
should sadden but not surprise us. As the great tort scholar Guido
Calabresi points out: "[O]ne need not be a racist to admit the
possibility that the stereotypes may have some truth to them. I don't
believe in race, but if people are treated badly in a racist society on
account of an irrelevant characteristic such as color or language, it
should not be surprising if they react to that treatment in their
everyday behavior."
3
At bottom, therefore, the issue distills to this: Assuming
statistics show the existence of some rational relation between race
and the risk of crime, would discrimination on this basis-we could
term such discrimination "rational discrimination"--be reasonable?
Answering this decisive question requires us to examine the
relationship between rationality and reasonableness; tort law and
jurisprudence have much to say about the nature of reasonableness.
Answering this questions also calls on us to undertake certain
epistemological inquiries, such as the relationship between factual
determinations and value judgments (which are commonly assumed
to be independent of one another but which I will show actually are
not). Certain features of the B<PL formula also shed clarifying light
on this subject; drawing on them we will outline a "tort theory of
knowledge," if you will. In the end, I will try to demonstrate through
this analysis the shared conceptual, theoretical, philosophical, and
normative linkages between civil rights and civil justice viewed
through the lenses of torts.
I. WHY RATIONAL DISCRIMINATION IS NOT REASONABLE
The most readily apparent objection to the reasonableness claim
of the Bayesian challenges the statistical method employed to assess
the victim's dangerousness. Neither private nor judicial judgments
about a particular member of a class, the argument goes, should rest
on evidence about the class to which he or she belongs. Despite the
attractiveness of this principle, and occasional court admonitions to
avoid statistical inferences about individuals, private and judicial
3. GuIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATrITUDES, AND THE LAW 28
(1985).
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decision makers routinely rely on statistical evidence to judge past
facts and predict future behavior. Lenders use statistics concerning
age, marital status, location or residence, income, and assets to
predict whether a borrower will repay a loan. Parole commissions
may also use statistical techniques to predict parole success,
considering factors such as number of prior convictions, type of
crime, employment history, and family ties.4 And courts consider
nonindividualized statistical probabilities when deciding whether to
allow injured litigants to use epidemiological proof of causation in
their lawsuits.
To accept the usefulness of statistical generalizations as a
general matter, however, is not to agree that such generalizations are
appropriate everywhere. For the use of statistical generalizations
entails significant social costs, notwithstanding obvious benefits to
defendants. The fatal flaw in the "Bayesian" argument lies in the
failure to take account of the costs of acting on Bayesian's racial
generalizations. Instead, Bayesians assume that the rationality of
their factual judgments is all that matters in assessing the
reasonableness of their reactions. Thus, they assert that if racial
identity incrementally increases the likelihood that an ambiguous
Black man is about to attack (i.e., if it incrementally bolsters the
accuracy of their factual judgment that they are under attack), then it
is reasonable for them to use deadly force against the Black more
quickly than a similarly situated White. Whether a reaction is
reasonable, however, hinges not only on the rationality of its
underlying factual judgments, but equally on the consequences of
error if those factual judgments are mistaken.
Consider one example of the injustices that lurk in
the Bayesian's lopsided attention to rationality. Ira Glasser of the
American Civil Liberties Union tells the story of a Black couple
who, some years ago, took in a movie in Times Square. It was
raining when they came out of the theater about 11 P.M., so the
husband went by himself for the car, which was parked in a garage
several blocks away. When he returned to pick up his wife, she had
disappeared. The man eventually discovered that his wife, who was
4. Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior
with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408,
1420-22 (1979).
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five months pregnant, had been arrested by the police, put in jail,
strip-searched and booked on charges of loitering for the purpose of
prostitution.
The arresting officer in this shocking incident may well have
viewed himself as an Intelligent Bayesian. Perhaps wrongly, let's
assume that at the time he made the arrest, there was a high incidence
of prostitution in Times Square, most of the prostitutes were
unescorted women, a disproportionate number of them were Black,
and most transactions occurred between 10 P.M. and 2 A.M. The
officer might assert that, from his standpoint, there was significant
evidence to support his factual judgment that the woman was a
prostitute-she was a woman, Black, unescorted, and in Times
Square at 11 o'clock at night. Even if we assume that his belief was
rational in the sense that there was factual support for it, his decision
to act on this belief in the way he did was patently unreasonable, not
to mention outrageous and reprehensible. The reason his actions
were unreasonable is because the costs of potential mistakes were so
grievous. Given the enormous costs of potential mistakes, we rightly
condemn him for not doing more to reduce the risk of being mistaken
before subjecting this woman to such treatment. Many of us may
express our concerns about the terrible costs of being wrong in this
situation, as well as doubt about whether the officer's factual
judgments were rational. But, upon careful reflection, we see that we
are really saying that given the potential for mistakes and the terrible
consequences of his mistake, the actions of the officer were
unreasonable, even if his factual judgment was rational in the sense
that there were circumstances to support it.
To see this, consider two situations, in each of which I claim to
know that my pet dog, a temperamental, unpredictable Rottweiler, is
chained to a tree in our fenced-in backyard. In the first case, I
personally hook the chain to his collar three hours before bedtime.
As I am turning in for the night, my significant other asks me
whether the dog is chained. If he really is still chained, he will
simply spend the night in his doghouse as usual. But if he is not still
chained, he will roam the backyard all night, strategically squirting
urine on lawn chairs and fixtures in service of his territorial instincts.
It takes fifteen minutes the following morning for me to retrace his
steps and hose down all that he has marked-a chore I do not relish
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but cannot honestly characterize as more than an inconvenience. In
such a case I would confidently claim to know the dog is chained and
dive into bed.
In contrast, if my sister's one-year-old infant wanted to play in
an area of our backyard beyond the reach of the chain and my sister
asked me whether the dog was leashed, I would not claim to know
that he was if I had not checked on him in three hours. Put
differently, it would not be reasonable for me to claim to know he
was leashed in this situation. This is true even though the statistical
risk of error in my factual judgment that the dog is leashedCthat is,
the accuracy of my factual judgment about the dogCwould be
exactly the same in both situations. For the costs of error in the
second case (the life of my niece) are infinitely greater than the costs
of error in the first (momentary inconvenience). Thus, before
claiming to know that he is leashed in the second case, I would
gather more information to further reduce the risk of error by, for
example, double-checking the chain and yanking on the collar
several times. Holding the risk of error about the security of the
leash constant in the two situations, my willingness to claim to know
that the dog was secured would vary according to the social
consequences of error. Put differently, even if the rationality or
accuracy of my factual judgment was the same in two situations, my
willingness to claim to know something would vary according to the
social consequences of error.
Bayesians try to avoid discussion of the consequences
of error by focusing solely on their subjective factual judgments-
specifically, on whether their hastier conclusion that the
"ambiguous" Black man was about to attack was rational given that
Blacks pose a marginally greater risk of assault than Whites. It is
true that judging that one knows something may be a subjective
thought process, a "state of mind." For example, when the officer,
upon seeing the unescorted Black woman in Times Square in the late
evening, concluded that she was a prostitute, something purely
subjective occurred in his thought processes.
What the Bayesians overlook, however, is that the hastier
conclusion that they are under attack leads them to make a decision
to more hastily shoot a Black man. The reasonableness of that
decision and act (hastier use of deadly force against Blacks) is just as
1474
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much at issue in these situations as the rationality of their hastier
factual judgment that they were about to be attacked. To return to
the Rottweiler example, to claim to know that something is the case
is more than a thought process; it is the performance of a social
act-it is to say something that lends assurance to others and which
they will rely upon. In this respect a claim to knowledge is like a
promise, another clearly social act. Thus, when I tell my wife as I
hop into bed that I know the Rottweiler is leashed, I am assuring her
that the risks of error in my factual judgment about the leash can
be safely disregarded in view of the not-too-weighty interests
(convenience) that a wrong judgment may injure. Likewise, when I
tell my sister that I know the dog is leashed (which I do only after
drastically reducing the risk of error by gathering more information
on the condition of the leash), I am assuring her that the drastically
reduced risks of error in my factual judgment are sufficiently small
that they can be safely disregarded in view of the extremely weighty
interests that a wrong judgment may injure.
This same analysis applies to factual judgments and acts of the
Bayesian. The Bayesian's hastier conclusion that an "ambiguous
BlackV is about to attack may be a subjective thought process-a
subjective factual judgment. But when Bayesians decide to act on
their race-based factual judgments by using deadly force more
quickly against ambiguous Blacks, they imply that the risks of error
in their hastier use of deadly force against Blacks can be safely
disregarded in view of the interests that wrong predictions will
injure.
To determine whether the risks of error in race-based predictions
about Blacks can be safely-that is, reasonably-disregarded, it is
necessary to balance the costs of waiting for an "ambiguous" or
"suspicious" Black man to clarify his violent intentions against the
costs of not waiting. All predictions of human behavior present some
risk of error. The more information we possess about a given
situation, the smaller the risk of error in our judgments about it.
Taking the time to gather information is costly, however. And
nowhere are information costs higher than in self-defense cases,
where the only way to gather more information is to wait for
"suspicious" persons to manifest their violent intentions more clearly
before responding with force. Here the cost of waiting translates into
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increased risk for people who want to defend themselves
successfully. If they consider Blacks to pose a "significantly"
greater threat of assault than Whites, they will not wait as long for an
"ambiguous" Black man to clarify his violent intentions as for a
White man.
On the other hand, the costs of not waiting as long for Blacks
with unclear intentions as for similarly situated Whites include both
the risks of error in race-based generalizations and the social
consequences of error when the predictions prove false. First,
consider the risks of error in race-based generalizations. Take the
statistic for Black males arrested for violent assaults of
approximately two percent (which is still much greater than the
actual probability that a Black male will rob a stranger, since the
violent assaults statistic also includes, inter alia, arrests for domestic
violence, barroom brawls, street fights, heat of passion altercations
between friends and acquaintances, turf wars between gang
members, and conflicts growing out of drug transactions), and
assume this number represents the risk that the Black man entering
the bank lobby in our hypothetical scenario was about to attack the
woman at the ATM. Further assume that if this scenario occurred
fifty different times and involved fifty different women throughout
the city, then in two percent of the cases-or one out of fifty times-
the woman's belief that she was under attack would be correct. This
means that of the fifty Blacks against whom defenders will use
hastier lethal force because of racial generalizations, forty-nine will
be innocent.
Next, consider the social consequences of error. The costs of
error in race-based predictions of violence go well beyond the
physical injuries suffered by the innocent Black victims of false
predictions. Not waiting as long for Blacks to clarify their intentions
has a profound "chilling effect" on Black participation in core
community activities. That is, hastier use of force against Blacks
forces Blacks who do not want to be mistaken for assailants to avoid
ostensibly public places (such as "White" neighborhoods, automatic
tellers, and even tony boutiques) and core community activities (such
as shopping, jogging, sightseeing, or just "hanging out"). Further,
Blacks who do venture into the public arena are compelled to stifle
self-expression and move about in a withdrawn, timorous fashion lest
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they appear threatening to some anxious gun-toting pedestrian or
subway rider.
An analogy may underscore the grim reality of "chilling
effects." When I described the Times Square incident to a Black
woman who teaches law at a major Midwestern university, she
confided that she had also been mistaken for a prostitute on two
occasions. On one, she had an appointment to meet someone at a
hotel entrance. As she waited just outside the lobby door, a man in a
business suit sidled up to her and asked what her services were going
for. Ever since, she has strictly avoided meeting people at the
entrances of hotels or in hotel lobbies, even though many law school
conferences take place in hotels. On those occasions when she has
no choice but to meet a group of people in a hotel lobby, she makes
sure she arrives a little late so that she does not end up standing alone
in the lobby before others arrive.
Another cost of not waiting concerns the denial of moral agency
inflicted on Blacks by race-based suspicions. Race-based predictions
of people's behavior reduces them to predictable objects rather than
treating them as moral beings capable of personal autonomy.5 Of
course, all predictions of human behavior undermine respect for
personal autonomy to some degree. But respect for another's
autonomy is especially undermined when the forecast that a person
will choose to act violently is based on a factor-such as race---over
which that person has no control.6
Moreover, humiliation and stigmatization must be counted
among the most painful costs of race-based suspicions. It is too easy
for some to trivialize the severe psychological, emotional, and even
spiritual costs to Blacks of being treated like criminals. For instance,
according to Suzanna Sherry, a vocal critic of progressive feminist
and minority perspectives on American justice, "[The] description of
the young Black man who felt resentment when a White woman with
a baby crossed the street to avoid him naturally invites a comparison:
he fears for his emotional well-being; but she fears for her physical
safety. I, at least, would rather be snubbed than raped.",7 In saying
5. Underwood, supra note 4, at 1414-16, 1434-36.
6. Id.
7. Suzanna Sherry, The Forgotten Victims, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 375, 375
(1992) (emphasis added).
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that she would rather be "snubbed" than raped, Sherry speciously
pits two certainties against each other-the certainty of being
"snubbed" against the certainty of being raped. This is a gross
distortion of the situation. In truth, the situation pits an extremely
remote risk of being raped by a random Black man (nothing in the
description of the situation suggested that the young man was acting
in a threatening or erratic way) against the certainty of being
"snubbed." Sherry's non sequitur vividly illustrates the rationality
subverting power of stereotypes, for only by tapping the "Black as
rapist" stereotype can she regard a rape by an ordinary Black man on
an ordinary street not as an extremely remote risk but as a foregone
conclusion.
More telling for "cost of not waiting" analysis is Sherry's
trivialization of the humiliation and resentment suffered by the
young Black man who was treated like a rapist. Characterizing the
young man's injury as a case of being "snubbed" lumps it with
breaches of social etiquette such as being ignored by an acquaintance
or failing to receive an invitation to an ice cream social. The
euphemism carries with it nothing of the relentless, cumulative,
dehumanizing reality of these manifestations of the Black Tax par
excellence. "Here we go again," muses the young Black man.
"She's tripping all over herself to cross over to the other sidewalk, all
the while cutting her eyes at me like I'm Willie Horton on work
furlough. Somebody said being invisible was a terrible thing. I
know something worse.., being too visible.., walking around with
a screaming BIG BLACK MAN warning ineradicably tattooed
across your forehead. They look right through invisible men, but the
too-visible ones they use like movie screens for the projection of
their most demeaning, pornographic images. I always feel like
taking a bath after these encounters, but with so many to contend
with every day, if I tried to bathe after every one, I'd live in the
bathtub." From the standpoint of doing justice to the severe
dignitary injuries inflicted by these "microaggressions," a better
comparison than "I'd rather be snubbed than raped" would be "I'd
rather have waves of strangers successively spit in my face than run
the extremely remote risk that a random anonymous Black man
might rape me."
Once we consider the risks of error and the grave social
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consequences of error generated by statistical generalizations about
race, we see that much more than number crunching is involved in
assessing the reasonableness of using lethal force on the basis of
such generalizations. Considerations of fairness and social justice
figure as centrally in these assessments of reasonableness as
considerations of factual accuracy. Telling defenders that they
cannot base their decisions to shoot on racial generalizations may
require them to wait slightly longer-as long as they would if the
ambiguous person were White-than they would if they were
allowed to use such generalizations. The costs of waiting (increased
risk for defender) are not trivial. But when balanced against the
costs of not waiting (injury or death to numerous innocent victims,
exclusion of Blacks from core community activities, objectification,
stigmatization, and humiliation), the scales of justice tilt decidedly in
favor of the defender assuming the marginal additional risks of
waiting.
Citizens are frequently called upon to incur additional risks for
important principles and social values. Drafts for military service are
obvious examples. Perhaps less obvious, but much more pervasive,
are the health and safety risks we all incur in the interest of values
such as freedom of expression, the right to bear arms, and even the
less lofty values of technological progress (motor vehicles, for
instance, take many more lives each year than they save, including
many pedestrians) 8 and convenience (increases in the speed limit for
cars exposes everyone on the highway to substantially greater
danger, including those who continue to drive at the old lower speed
limit).9 We allow teenagers to drive, even though they generate an
8. Pedestrian deaths alone accounted for more than 13 percent of traffic
fatalities in the United States in 1994, according to the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration. Of 40,000 traffic-related deaths in 1994, nearly
5,500 were pedestrians, of which 800 were children age fifteen or under.
NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., TRAFFIC
SAFETY FACTS 1994-PEDESTRIANS 2, at www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-
30/NCSA/TSF94/pedfct94.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2005).
9. "A study by the Texas Transportation Institute at Texas A&M
University looked at highway deaths in the state four years before and four
years after rural speed limits were raised to 65 mph in 1987. The study found
the serious accident rate rose 25 percent." Lisa Teachey, Good News for
Houston Drivers, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 11, 1995, at 33, 1995 WL 9415267.
(In 1993, an updated study showed the death and injury statistics went back to
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astonishingly disproportionate percentage of accidents, because we
think it is important that they enjoy access to adult activities as part
of their maturation process. Similarly, we license individuals with
disabilities and prosthetic devices to drive, and hold them to a lower
legal standard of reasonable care (in effect allowing them to generate
more than ordinary risks without liability), because we believe it is
important that they have equal access to core community activities.
The list goes on, but this partial one suffices to show that expecting
citizens to incur additional risks (especially additional risks as small
as the ones being considered here) for the sake of important social
interests is a familiar feature of our legal culture and social morality.
This analysis applies with equal force to shopkeepers, cab-
drivers, and any other class of decision makers prone to screen
"suspicious" persons on the basis of race. Shopkeepers and cab-
drivers incur some risk in admitting "ambiguous" individuals. Yet,
reducing Black Americans to second-class citizens denies them
equitable participation in social and commercial existence. It
subjects the overwhelming majority of innocent Blacks to demeaning
assumptions and microaggressions and; contributes to the
establishment of a de facto system of apartheid by private
discriminatory decisions. These are the costs of race-based screening
and they cannot be morally justified by the incremental risk.
Sometimes, tragically, the risk of violent robbery, albeit small, is
realized. By the same token, the risk of death or serious injury in
automobiles and airplanes, albeit small, is realized hundreds of
thousands of times every year. Yet we continue to expose ourselves
to the risks of the airways and highways in ever-growing numbers.
We simply do not live in a risk-free society, nor are we willing to
sacrifice the values and conveniences that a dramatically less risky
society would cost. Viewing our risk-laden social existence from
this broader, tort-based perspective, incremental race-based risks are
not meaningfully different from thousands of other incremental risks
we assume every day in return for a comfortable, convenient, decent,
and democratic way of life. Accordingly, we must accept
their levels before the speed limits increased in 1987). Id. "According to the
National Safety Council, a nongovernmental, not-for-profit public service
organization dedicated to reducing accidental deaths and injuries, raising speed
limits could jeopardize highway safety across the country." Id.
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incremental, race-based risks as the price of living in a just, humane,
democratic society, as just, humane, democratic citizens.
In sum, the "Reasonable Person" does not discriminate against
Blacks on the basis of racial generalizations. The Reasonable Person
can be fairly expected to surmount his or her discriminatory impulses
and incur incremental race-based risks to protect vital democratic
values. Because the reasonable and the moral are flip sides of the
same coin, 10 an individual who shoots or screens others on racial
grounds engages in blameworthy conduct. Bluntly put, the
Bayesian's decision to discriminate against Blacks on the basis of
statistical generalizations is racist.
Some readers may recoil at the use of the value-laden term
"racist" to describe ostensibly rational racial discrimination.
Assessments of reasonableness, however, essentially turn on a
balancing of values, making the term "reasonable" itself a
value-laden expression. Referring to Bayesians' discriminatory
decisions as racist simply stresses that they strike an unreasonable
balance in a way that wrongfully devalues or undervalues the
democratic interests of Black Americans in being treated as full and
equal citizens.
Saying that so-called rational discrimination is racist is not the
same as saying that all cabdrivers, shopkeepers, and others who have
historically discriminated against Blacks on grounds they believed to
be rational are incorrigible racists. Many well-intentioned people
simply have not had the enormous costs and incremental gains of
their discriminatory decisions put in perspective. The racist is the
person who says, "Yes, I appreciate the large risks of error and the
grave social consequences of error that racial generalizations
involve. And, yes, I understand that every day I willingly expose
myself to many risks greater than those incremental risks posed by
Blacks, in some cases for lofty reasons and in other cases for very
mundane ones. Nevertheless, I do not consider the interests of Black
Americans worth incurring any incremental risks. So I will not buzz
them in, pick them up, or wait as long to shoot an 'ambiguous one'
as I would wait for a similarly situated White." Appeals to principle
10. See Jody Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists,
Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REv. 789-90
(1994).
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like those developed in this discussion may reach only those well-
intentioned people who seek to avoid racism, and who therefore can
be persuaded to stop engaging in racist practices. Racially illiberal
Americans who refuse to adequately credit the interests of Blacks in
their decision making, on the other hand, require alternative
approaches to helping them avoid discrimination.
This analysis retains its vitality even if the risk estimates
concerning Black assaults are modified. There may continue to be
debate about the most accurate risk-of-assault statistics for Blacks,
but as long as the risks of error in the racial generalizations remain
high, and the social consequences of error remain grave and
far-reaching, moral and policy arguments against using statistical
generalizations to visit serious injuries on Blacks remain compelling.
